P. Dillenbourg (Universite de Geneve, Switzerland)
M. Baker (CNRS, France)
A. Blaye (Universite de Provence a Aix, France)
C. O'Malley (University of Nottingham, UK)
Abstract. For many years, theories of collaborative learning
tended to focus on how individuals function in a group. More
recently, the focus has shifted so that the group itself has become
the unit of analysis. In terms of empirical research, the initial goal
was to establish whether and under what circumstances
collaborative learning was more effective than learning alone.
Researchers controlled several independent variables (size of the
group, composition of the group, nature of the task, communication
media, and so on). However, these variables interacted with one
another in a way that made it almost impossible to establish causal
links between the conditions and the effects of collaboration.
Hence, empirical studies have more recently started to focus less on
establishing parameters for effective collaboration and more on
trying to understand the role which such variables play in mediating
interaction. In this chapter, we argue that this shift to a more
process-oriented account requires new tools for analysing and
modelling interactions.
1. Introduction
For many years, theories of collaborative learning tended to focus on how
individuals function in a group. This reflected a position which was dominant
both in cognitive psychology and in artificial intelligence in the 1970s and early
1980s, where cognition was seen as a product of individual information
processors, and where the context of social interaction was seen more as a
background for individual activity than as a focus of research in itself. More
recently, the group itself has become the unit of analysis and the focus has
shifted to more emergent, socially constructed, properties of the interaction.
In terms of empirical research, the initial goal was to establish whether and
under what circumstances collaborative learning was more effective than
learning alone. Researchers controlled several independent variables (size of the
group, composition of the group, nature of the task, communication media, and
so on). However, these variables interacted with one another in a way that made
it almost impossible to establish causal links between the conditions and the
effects of collaboration. Hence, empirical studies have more recently started to
focus less on establishing parameters for effective collaboration and more on
trying to understand the role which such variables play in mediating interaction.
This shift to a more process-oriented account requires new tools for analysing
and modelling interactions.
This chapter presents some of the major developments over recent years in this
field, in both theoretical and empirical terms, and then considers the
implications of such changes for tools and methods with which to observe and
analyse interactions between learners. In so doing, we have tried to address
both the work done in psychology and in distributed artificial intelligence
(DAI). However, we have to acknowledge that this chapter has a bias towards
psychology Ñ not only because it reflects the interests of the authors to a large
extent, but also because DAI has focused more on cooperative problem solving
than on collaborative learning.
At this point we need to make a brief comment on this distinction: learning
versus problem solving and collaboration versus cooperation. While
psychologists consider that learning and problem solving are similar processes,
computer scientists still address them separately. Different research
communities (DAI versus machine learning, for example) have developed
different techniques, some for learning and some for problem solving. The
'collaboration' versus 'cooperation' debate is more complex. Some people use
these terms interchangeably. (Indeed, there is some disagreement amongst the
authors themselves.) For the purposes of this chapter, in acknowledgement of
distinctions that others in the field have made, we stick to a restricted definition
of the terms. ÒCollaboration" is distinguished from "cooperation" in that
cooperative work "... is accomplished by the division of labor among
participants, as an activity where each person is responsible for a portion of the
problem solving...", whereas collaboration involves the "... mutual engagement
of participants in a coordinated effort to solve the problem together." (Roschelle
& Teasley, in press).
Defining collaboration by the non-distribution of labour does not avoid
ambiguities. Miyake has shown that some spontaneous division of labour may
occur in collaboration: "The person who has more to say about the current topic
takes the task-doer's role, while the other becomes an observer, monitoring the
situation. The observer can contribute by criticising and giving topic-divergent
motions, which are not the primary roles of the task-doer." (Miyake, 1986; p.
174). O'Malley (1987) reported similar results with pairs attempting to
understand the UNIX C-shell command interpreter. This distribution of roles
depends on the nature of the task and may change frequently. For example, in
computer-supported tasks, the participant who controls the mouse tends to be
"executor", while the other is likely to be the "reflector" (Blaye, Light, Joiner,
& Sheldon, 1991). Cooperation and collaboration do not differ in terms of
whether or not the task is distributed, but by virtue of the way in which it is
divided: in cooperation, the task is split (hierarchically) into independent
subtasks; in collaboration, cognitive processes may be (heterarchically) divided
into intertwined layers. In cooperation, coordination in only required when
assembling partial results, while collaboration is "... a coordinated,
synchronous activity that is the result of a continued attempt to construct and
maintain a shared conception of a problem" (Roschelle & Teasley, in press).
2. Theoretical Issues: the individual or the group as the unit
What is the nature of the dyad in collaborative learning? It can be viewed as
comprising two relatively independent cognitive systems which exchange
messages. It can also be viewed as a single cognitive system with is own
properties. These two different answers to the question serve to anchor the two
ends of the theoretical axis. At one end, the unit of analysis is the individual.
The goal for research is to understand how one cognitive system is transformed
by messages received from another. At the other end of the axis, the unit of
analysis is the group. The challenge is to understand how these cognitive
systems merge to produce a shared understanding of the problem. Along this
axis, between the Ôindividual' and the 'group', we can find three different
theoretical positions: socio-constructivist, socio-cultural and shared (or
distributed) cognition approaches.
In this chapter we talk about an ÔevolutionÕ along this axis because the social
end has recently received more attention Ñ maybe because it has been
previously neglected. We do not mean to imply than one viewpoint is better
than another: scientists need both pictures from microscopes and pictures from
satellites. Moreover, for the sake of exposition, the approaches will be
presented as more different than they actually are. Both Piaget and Vygotsky
acknowledge the intertwined social and individual aspects of development
(Butterworth, 1982).
2.1. The socio-constructivist approach
Although Piaget's theory focused mainly on individual aspects in cognitive
development, it inspired a group of psychologists (the so-called ÒGenevan
SchoolÓ) who in the 1970s undertook a systematic empirical investigation of
how social interaction affects individual cognitive development (cf. Doise &
Mugny, 1984). These researchers borrowed from the Piagetian perspective its
structural framework and the major concepts which were used to account for
development: conflict and the coordination of points of view (centrations). This
new approach described itself as a socio-constructivist approach: it enhanced the
role of inter-actions with others rather than actions themselves.
The main thesis of this approach is that "...it is above all through interacting
with others, coordinating his/her approaches to reality with those of others, that
the individual masters new approaches" (Doise, 1990, p.46). Individual
cognitive development is seen as the result of a spiral of causality: a given level
of individual development allows participation in certain social interactions
which produce new individual states which, in turn, make possible more
sophisticated social interaction, and so on.
Despite this theoretical claim, which suggests a complex intertwining between
the social and the individual plane, the experimental paradigm used by its
proponents involved two supposedly "individual" phases (pre- and post-test),
separated by an intervention session in which subjects worked either alone
(control condition) or in pairs. Evidence showed that, under certain conditions,
peer interaction produced superior performances on individual post-test than
individual training (for reviews, see Doise & Mugny, 1984; Blaye, 1988). The
studies which established this tradition of research involved children in the age-
range 5-7 years, and relied essentially on Piagetian conservation tasks. Where
working in pairs facilitated subsequent individual performance, the mediating
process was characterised as "socio-cognitive conflict", i.e. conflict between
different answers based on different centrations, embodied socially in the
differing perspectives of the two subjects. The social dimension of the situation
was seen as providing the impetus towards or catalyst for resolving the conflict.
Such resolution could be achieved by transcending the different centrations to
arrive at a more advanced "decentred" solution.
From this perspective, the question was asked: under which conditions might
socio-cognitive conflict be induced? One answer was to pair children who were,
from a Piagetian perspective, at different stages of cognitive development.
However, it was emphasised that subsequent individual progress cannot be
explained by one child simply modelling the other, more advanced, child. It has
been repeatedly demonstrated that "two wrongs can make a right" (Glachan &
Light, 1981). What is at stake here, then, is not imitation but a co-ordination of
answers. Subjects at the same level of cognitive development but who enter the
situation with different perspectives (due to spatial organisation, for instance)
can also benefit from conflictual interactions (Mugny, Levy & Doise, 1978;
Glachan & Light, 1982).
Researchers in DAI report similar empirical results. Durfee et al (1989) showed
that the performance of a network of problem solving agents is better when
there is some inconsistency among the knowledge of each agent. Gasser (1991)
pointed out the role of multiple representations and the need for mechanisms for
reasoning among multiple representations (see Saitta, this volume). These
findings concern the heterogeneity of a multi-agent system. Bird (1993)
discriminates various forms of heterogeneity: when agents have different
knowledge, use various knowledge representation schemes or use different
reasoning mechanisms (induction, deduction, analogy, etc.). For Bird,
heterogeneity is one of the three dimensions that define the design space for
multi-agent systems. The other dimensions, distribution and autonomy, will be
discussed later.
The success of the concept of conflict in computer systems is not surprising.
This logical concept can be modelled in terms of knowledge or beliefs and
integrated in truth maintenance systems or dialogue models. However, the main
proponents of socio-cultural theory now admit that their view has probably been
too mechanistic (Perret-Clermont et al., 1991). Blaye's empirical studies
(Blaye, 1988) have highlighted the limits of "socio-cognitive conflict" as "the"
underlying causal mechanism of social facilitation of cognitive development.
Disagreement in itself seems to be less important than the fact that it generates
communication between peer members (Blaye, 1988; Gilly, 1989). Bearison et
al. (1986) reported that non-verbal disagreement (manifested for instance by
moving the object positioned by the partner) was not predictive of post-test
gains.
The role of verbalisation may be to make explicit mutual regulation processes
and thereby contribute to the internalisation of these regulation mechanisms by
each partner (Blaye, 1988). This interpretation leads us to the socio-cultural
theory discussed in the next section.
2.2. The socio-cultural approach
The second major theoretical influence comes from Vygotsky (1962, 1978) and
researchers from the socio-cultural perspective (Wertsch, 1979, 1985, 1991;
Rogoff, 1990). While the socio-cognitive approach focused on individual
development in the context of social interaction, the socio-cultural approach
focuses on the causal relationship between social interaction and individual
cognitive change. The basic unit of analysis is social activity, from which
individual mental functioning develops. Whereas a Piagetian approach sees
social interaction as providing a catalyst for individual change, often dependent
upon individual development, from a Vygotskian perspective, inter-
psychological processes are themselves internalised by the individuals involved.
Vygotsky argued that development appears on two planes: first on the inter-
psychological, then on the intra-psychological. This is his Ògenetic law of
cultural developmentÓ. Internalisation refers to the genetic link between the
social and the inner planes. Social speech is used for interacting with others,
inner speech is used to talk to ourselves, to reflect, to think. Inner speech serves
the function of self-regulation.
A simple computational model of internalisation has been developed by
Dillenbourg and Self (1992). The system includes two agents able to argue with
each other. The agent's reasoning is implemented as an argumentation with
itself (inner speech). Each learner stores the conversations conducted during
collaborative problem solving and re-instantiates elements from the dialogue for
its own reasoning. The learner may for instance discard an argument that has
been previously refuted by its partner in a similar context. The psychological
reality is of course more complex, what takes place at the inter-psychological
level is not merely copied to the intra-psychological, but involves an active
transformation by the individual.
The mechanism through which participation in joint problem solving may
change the understanding of a problem is referred to as ÒappropriationÓ
(Rogoff, 1991). Appropriation is the socially-oriented version of Piaget's
biologically-originated concept of assimilation (Newman, Griffin and Cole,
1989). It is a mutual process: each partner gives meaning to the other's actions
according to his or her own conceptual framework. Let us consider two
persons, A and B, who solve a problem jointly. A performs the first action. B
does the next one. B's action indicates to A how B interpreted A's first action.
Fox (1987) reported that humans modify the meaning of their action
retrospectively, according to the actions of others that follow it. From a
computational viewpoint, this mechanism of appropriation requires a high level
of opportunism from agent-B, which must integrate agent-A's contribution,
even if this action was not part of his plans.
Like the previous approach, this theory also attaches significance to the degree
of difference among co-learners. Vygotsky (1978) defined the Òzone of
proximal developmentÓ as Ò...the distance between the actual developmental
level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential
development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in
collaboration with more capable peers.Ó We will see that this concept is
important to understand some empirical results.
Research in DAI does not directly refer to Vygotskian positions. This is
somewhat surprising since the issue of regulation, which is central to the socio-
cultural theory, is also a major issue in DAI. In computational terms, regulation
is more often referred to as a an issue of 'control' or 'autonomy'. For Bird
(1993), it constitutes the second dimension of the design space for multi-agent
systems. As in political structures, there exist centralised systems where control
is achieved by a super-agent or a central data structure (e.g., blackboard
architectures) and decentralised systems in which each agent has more
autonomy. An agent is more autonomous if it executes local functions without
interference with external operations (execution autonomy), if it chooses when
and with whom it communicates (communication autonomy) and whether it
self-organises into hierarchical, serial or parallel sub-processes (structural
autonomy) (Bird, 1993).
2.3. The shared cognition approach
The concept of shared cognition is deeply intertwined with the 'situated
cognition' theory (Suchman, 1987; Lave, 1988 Ñ see also Mandl, this
volume). For those researchers, the environment is an integral part of cognitive
activity, and not merely a set of circumstances in which context-independent
cognitive processes are performed. The environment includes a physical context
and a social context. Under the influence of sociologists and anthropologists,
the focus is placed largely on the social context, i.e. not only the temporary
group of collaborators, but the social communities in which these collaborators
participate.
This approach offers a new perspective on the socio-cognitive and the socio-
cultural approaches, and has recently led to certain revisions by erstwhile
proponents of the earlier theories. Perret-Clermont et al. (1991), for example,
question the experimental settings they had previously used for developing the
socio-constructivist approach. They noticed that their subjects tried to converge
toward the experimenter's expectations. The subjects' answers were influenced
by the meaning they had inferred from their social relationship with the
experimenter. Wertsch (1991) makes similar criticisms against work in the
socio-cultural tradition: social interactions are studied as if they occur outside a
social structure. Through language, we acquire a culture which is specific to a
community. For instance, we switch grammar and vocabulary rapidly between
an academic seminar room and the changing rooms of a sports centre. But
overall, beyond a vocabulary and a grammar, we acquire a structure of social
meanings and relationships (Resnick, 1991) that are fundamental for future
social interactions.
This approach challenges the methodology used in many experiments where the
subjects perform post-tests individually, often in a laboratory setting. More
fundamentally, this approach questions the theoretical bases on which the
previous ones rely: "... research paradigms built on supposedly clear
distinctions between what is social and what is cognitive will have an inherent
weakness, because the causality of social and cognitive processes is, at the very
least, circular and is perhaps even more complex" (Perret-Clermont, Perret and
Bell, 1991, p. 50). Collaboration is viewed as the process of building and
maintaining a shared conception of a problem (Roschelle & Teasley, in press).
While the previous approaches were concerned with the inter-individual plane,
the shared cognition approach focuses on the social plane, where emergent
conceptions are analysed as a group product. For instance, it has been observed
that providing explanations leads to improve knowledge (Webb 1991). From
the 'individualist' perspective, this can be explained through the self-
explanation effect (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann & Glaser, 1989). From a
'group' perspective, explanation is not something delivered by the explainer to
the explainee. As we will see in section 5, it is instead constructed jointly by
both partners trying to understand each other (Baker, 1991).
The idea that a group forms a single cognitive system may appear too
metaphorical to a psychologist. It does not surprise a computer scientist. While
the natural scale for a psychological agent is a human being, the scale of a
computational agent is purely arbitrary. The (vague) concept of agent is used to
represent sometimes a single neurone, a functional unit (e.g., the 'edge
detector' agent), an individual or even the world. The granularity of a
distributed system, i.e., the size of each agent, is a designer's choice. It is a
variable that the designer can tune to grasp phenomena that are invisible at
another scale. It supports systems with different layers of agents with various
scales, wherein one may compare communication among agents at level N and
communication among agents at level N+1. Dillenbourg and Self (1992) built a
system in which the same procedures are used for dialogue among agents and
for each agent's individual reasoning. Hutchins (1991) reports a two-layer
system wherein he can tune communication patterns among the units of an agent
(modelled as a network) and the communications among agents. According to
the respective strengths of intra-network and inter-network links, he observes
an increase or a decrease of the group confirmation bias which cannot be
reduced to individualsÕ contributions. Gasser (1991) insists on properties of
multi-agent systems which "will not be derivable or representable solely on the
basis of properties of their component agents" (p. 112).
3. Empirical Issues: effects, conditions and interactions
Not surprisingly, the different theoretical orientations we have just outlined
have tended to employ rather different research paradigms. Generally, socio-
cognitive experiments concerned two subjects of approximately the same age
(or the same developmental level) while the Vygotskian setting involved adult-
child pairs. Moreover, the Piagetian and Vygotskian paradigms used different
collaborative tasks. We come back to these differences later. Other paradigms
have been used independently of a particular theoretical framework, for instance
the 'reciprocal teaching' paradigm (Palincsar and Brown, 1984; Palincsar,
1987; Riggio et al., 1991) in which one learner plays the teacherÕs role for some
of the time and then shift roles with the other learner. We can also distinguish
empirical work according to the size of the groups involved (dyads versus
larger groups) or ways in which mediating technologies are employed, as in
computer-supported collaboration.
There are also differences between the various approaches in terms of the
research methods employed. In the socio-cognitive perspective, the
methodology was to set up conditions hypothesised to facilitate learning and to
compare the outcomes of this intervention with some control group. With such
methods, collaboration is treated as a black box; the focus is on outcomes. In
contrast, research from a socio-cultural point of view tends to employ micro
genetic analyses of the social interaction. The focus is on the processes involved
in social interaction. This is partly because of the importance attached to the
concept of mediation in socio-cultural theory. Evidence is sought from dialogue
for symbols and concepts which mediate social activity and which can in turn be
subsequently found to mediate individual activity. The shared cognition
approach obviously also favours the second methodology.
Despite their intertwining, we have attempted to disentangle the different
research paradigms and theoretical approaches. In what follows we describe the
ÔevolutionÕ of empirical research within three paradigms that differ with respect
to the number and the type of variables that are taken into account.
3.1 The "effect" paradigm
Experiments conducted to answer the question Òis collaborative learning more
efficient than learning alone?Ó were fairly straightforward. The independent
variable was 'collaborative work' versus 'work alone'. The choice of the
dependent measures varied according to what the investigators meant by 'more
efficient'. The most frequent measure was the subjectÕs performance when
solving alone the task they previously solved with somebody else. Some
researchers decomposed this dependent variable into several other measures of
performance, such as the improvement of monitoring and regulation skills
(Brown & Palincsar, 1989; Blaye & Chambres, 1991) or a decrease in the
confirmation bias. Within this paradigm, the precise analysis of effects is the
only way to understand the mechanisms that make collaborative learning
efficient.
This kind of research let to a body of contradictory results, within which the
positive outcomes largely dominate (Slavin, 1983; Webb, 1991). Nevertheless,
negative results cannot always be discarded as the result of experimental errors
or noise. Some negative effects are stable and well documented, for instance the
fact that low achievers progressively become passive when collaborating with
high achievers (Salomon and Globerson,1989; Mulryan, 1992). There is a
simple way to understand the controversial effects observed with the first
paradigm: collaboration is in itself neither efficient or inefficient. Collaboration
works under some conditions, and it is the aim of research to determine the
conditions under which collaborative learning is efficient. This brings us to the
second paradigm.
3.2 The "conditions" paradigm
To determine the conditions under which collaborative learning is efficient, one
has to vary these conditions systematically. While the first experimental
approach (in very general terms) varies only in terms of the dependent
measures, the second experimental approach varies along two dimensions, both
dependent and independent variables. Numerous independent variables have
been studied. They concern the composition of the group, the features of the
task, the context of collaboration and the medium available for communication.
The composition of the group covers several other independent variables such
as the number of members, their gender and the differences between
participants. It is not possible here to give a complete overview of the findings
concerning each of these variables. We will illustrate the work with three
examples.
3.2.1 Group heterogeneity
Group heterogeneity is probably the most studied variable. Scholars have
considered differences with respect to general intellectual development, social
status or domain expertise. They have considered objective and subjective
differences in expertise (whether the subjects are actually different or just
believe themselves to be so). We restrict ourselves here to objective differences
between the task knowledge of each subject, a parameter which is relevant for
DAI. For the socio-constructivist, this difference provides the conditions for
generating socio-cognitive conflict. For the socio-cultural approach, it provides
conditions for internalisation. However, the nature of differences differs within
each theoretical approach. Socio-cognitive theory refers to symmetrical pairs
(i.e., symmetrical with respect to general intellectual or developmental level)
where members have different viewpoints, whilst socio-cultural theory is
concerned with asymmetric pairs where members have different levels of skill.
Piaget (1965) argued that interaction with adults leads to asymmetrical power
relations or social status, and that in such interactions adults or more capable
children are likely to dominate. The pressure to conform in the presence of
someone with higher perceived status is not likely, in this view, to lead to
genuine cognitive change. Nonetheless, Rogoff (1990) notes that many studies
from a Piagetian perspective have involved pairing, for example, conservers
with non-conservers. This is hardly pairing children of equal intellectual ability
and is more consistent with the Vygotskian position. The point of difference
between the two approaches then is not one of ÒequalÓ versus ÒunequalÓ pairs,
but exactly what this equivalence entails. Researchers have attempted to
determine the optimal degree of differences. If it is too small, it may fail to
trigger interactions. If the difference is too large, there may be not interaction at
all. For instance, in a classification task, Kuhn (1972) shown children solutions
reflecting a difference of -1, 0 , +1 or +2 levels compared to their own
solutions. He only observed significant improvement in the +1 condition. This
notion of optimal difference also emerges in DAI where Gasser (1991) notes
that agents need a common semantics even to decide that conflict exists! The
'zone of proximal development' defines an optimal difference in an indirect
way, i.e. not as a difference between subjects A and B, but as a difference
between how A performs alone and how A performs with B's assistance.
Heterogeneity is also function of the size of the group. Empirical studies
showed that pairs are more effective than larger groups, but heterogeneity is not
the only factor that intervenes. Groups of three are less effective because they
tend to be competitive, whilst pairs tend to be more cooperative (Trowbridge,
1987). However, differences between group sizes seem to disappear when
children are given the opportunity to interact with other in the class (Colbourn &
Light, 1987).
3.2.2 Individual prerequisites
A second set of conditions defines some prerequisites to efficient collaboration.
It seems that collaboration does not benefit an individual if he or she is below a
certain developmental level. We consider here the absolute level of the
individual, not his or her level relative to the other group members. According
Piaget, for a conflictual interaction to give rise to progress, it must prompt
individual cognitive restructuring. This implies that a resolution of conflict
which would be exclusively based on social regulations (compliance from one
partner for instance) would prevent interaction from being efficient. PiagetÕs
theory predicts that pre-operational children lack the ability to decentre from
their own perspective and therefore benefit from collaborative work. Indeed, as
others have noted (Tudge & Rogoff, 1989), Piagetian theory in this respect
leads to something of a paradox. It is not clear whether social interaction leads
to the decentration necessary to benefit from collaboration, or that decentration
has to happen before genuine collaboration can take place. Other research
suggests that developmental factors need to be taken into account in resolving
this issue. Azmitia (1988) looked at pairs of 5 year old with equivalent general
abilities and found that when novices (with respect to the domain) were paired
with experts on a model building task they improved significantly, whilst equal
ability pairs did not. Azmitia argues that pre-schoolers may lack the skill to
sustain discussions of alternative hypotheses.
Vygotskian theory does not place the same sort of explicit developmental
constraints on the ability to benefit from collaboration, but recent researchers
(e.g., Wood et al., in press; Tomasello et al., 1993) have argued that certain
skills in understanding other peopleÕs mental states are required for this which
may set developmental constraints on collaborative learning. With a simple task
this may be achievable at around 4 years of age, since children at this age can
understand that another may lack the knowledge necessary to perform an action
(or misrepresent the situation) and they can predict the state of the otherÕs
knowledge. However, with more complex tasks, which demand reasoning
using that knowledge to predict the partner's actions on the basis of their belief
and intentions may not be achievable until about 6 years. In order to achieve
shared understanding in a collaborative activity, the child must also be able to
coordinate all these representations and have sufficient skills to communicate
with respect to them.
Research on peer tutoring has identified some conditions which are also relevant
to collaborative learning. The first condition is that the child-tutor must be
skilled at the task. Radziszewska and Rogoff (reported in Rogoff, 1990) found
that training a 9 year old peer to the same level of performance as an adult on a
planning task led to peer dyads performing as well as adult-child dyads and
better than peer dyads in which neither partner had been trained. A second pre-
requisite is the ability of the child to reflect upon his or her own performance
with respect to the task. Thirdly, in order to tutor contingently (i.e., to monitor
the effects of previous help on subsequent actions by the learner), the child has
to be able to assess whether the learnerÕs action was wrong with respect to the
instructions or wrong with respect to the task, and then be able to produce the
next tutorial action on the basis of both a representation of the previous
instruction and an evaluation of the learnerÕs response to that instruction. Ellis
and Rogoff (1982) found that 6 year old children were relatively unskilled at
contingent instruction compared with adult tutors. Wood et al. (in press) found
that 5 year old peer tutors were similarly unskilled relative to 7 year old tutors,
and that 5 year olds tended to have difficulty inhibiting their own actions
sufficiently to allow their ÒtuteeÓ to learn the task. However, children at this age
were better ÒcollaboratorsÓ than 3 year old comparison dyads.
3.2.3 Task features
Tasks that have been typically used in collaborative learning from a Vygotskian
perspective include skill acquisition, joint planning, categorisation and memory
tasks. In contrast, the implication from socio-cognitive theory is that tasks
should promote differences in perspectives or solutions. Typically,
conservation and coordination tasks involve perspective-taking, planning and
problem solving. There is thus little overlap in the nature of tasks investigated
from the Piagetian and Vygotskian perspective. It is also clear that the nature of
the task influences the results: one cannot observe conceptual change if the task
is purely procedural and does not involve much understanding; reciprocally one
cannot observe an improvement of regulation skills if the task requires no
planning. Some tasks are less ÒshareableÓ than others. For instance, solving
anagrams can hardly be done collaboratively because it involves perceptual
processes which are not easy to verbalise (if they are open to introspection at
all). In contrast, some tasks are inherently distributed, either geographically
(e.g., two radar-agents, receiving different data about the same aeroplane),
functionally (e.g., the pilot and the air traffic controller) or temporally (e.g., the
take-off agent and the landing-agent) (Durfee et al., 1989).
3.2.5 Interactions between variables
Researchers rapidly discovered that the independent variables we have
described so far do not have simple effects on learning outcomes but interact
with each other in a complex way. Let us for instance examine the interaction
between the composition of the pair and the task features. Studies that have
compared the relative benefits of interacting with adults versus interacting with
peers suggest that they vary according to the nature of the task, with peers being
more useful than adults in tasks which require discussion of issues. Adult-child
interaction may be more controlled by the adult rather than being a reciprocal
relationship. Children are more likely to justify their assertions with peers than
with adults. Rogoff (1990) notes that the differences between socio-cognitive
and socio-cultural approaches with respect to composition of dyads are
reconcilable. As she points out, whilst Vygotsky focused on acquiring
understanding and skills, Piaget emphasised changes in perspectives or
restructuring of concepts. Tutoring or guidance may be necessary for the
former, whilst collaboration between peers of equivalent intellectual ability may
be better in fostering the latter (Damon, 1984). So, how dyads or groups
should be composed with respect to skills and abilities may depend upon what
learning outcomes one is interested in (e.g., skill acquisition vs. conceptual
change) and what tasks are involved (e.g., acquiring new knowledge versus
restructuring existing knowledge).
Although few studies have involved a direct comparison of peer collaboration
and peer tutoring with the same task, the type of task may interact with the
developmental level of the learner and the nature of the dyad. For example,
Rogoff (1990) argues that planning tasks may be difficult for very young
children because they require reference to things which are not in the Òhere-and-
nowÓ. However, adults may be able to carry out such metacognitive or
metamnemonic roles that are beyond children, whilst demonstrating to the child
how such processing could be accomplished. So, certain types of task may
have inherent processing constraints which in turn place constraints on how the
interaction should be supported.
3.3 The "interactions" paradigm
The complexity of the findings collected in the second paradigm led to the
emergence of a third one. This introduces intermediate variables that describe
the interactions that occur during collaboration. The question "under which
conditions is collaborative learning efficient?" is split into two (hopefully
simpler) sub-questions: which interactions occur under which conditions and
what effects do these interactions have. The key is to find relevant intermediate
variables, i.e., variables that describe the interactions and that can be empirically
and theoretically related to the conditions of learning and to learning outcomes.
This methodology however raises interpretation difficulties: if some types of
interactions are positively correlated with task achievement, it may be that such
interactions influence achievement or, conversely that high achievers are the
only subjects able to engage these type of interaction (Webb, 1991).
Nevertheless, underlying this approach is a fundamental shift: it may be time to
stop looking for general effects of collaboration (e.g., in global developmental
terms) and focus instead on more specific effects, paying attention to the more
microgenetic features of the interaction. We will illustrate this viewpoint by two
examples that are important both in psychology and in DAI: explanation and
control.
3.3.1 Explanation
One way of describing interactions is to assess how elaborated is the help
provided by one learner to the other. This level of elaboration can be considered
as a continuum which goes from just giving the right answer to providing a
detailed explanation. Webb (1991) performed a meta-analysis of the research
conducted on this issue. This synthesis lead to two interesting results:
elaborated explanations are not related to the explainee's performance, but they
are positively correlated with the explainer's performance. Webb explains the
first result by the fact that learning from receiving explanations is submitted to
several conditions which may not be watched by the explainer, e.g., the fact the
information must be delivered when the peer needs it, that the peer must
understand it and must have the opportunity to us to solve the problem. The
second result, the explainer's benefit, has been observed by other scholars
(Bargh and Schul, 1980). Similar effects (called the self-explanation effect)
have been observed when a learner is forced to explain an example to himself
(Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann & Glaser, 1989). A computational model of the
self-explanation process have been proposed by VanLehn & Jones (1993). The
main principle is that the instantiation of general knowledge with particular
instances creates more specific knowledge, a mechanism that has also been
studied in machine learning under the label 'explanation-based learning'
(Mitchell et al., 1986). It would nevertheless be a mistake to consider self-
explanation and explanation to somebody else as identical mechanisms. This
would dramatically underestimate the role that the receiver plays in the
elaboration of the explanation. As we will see in section 5, an explanation is not
a message simply delivered by one peer to the other, but the result of joint
attempts to understand each other. Webb (1991) found that non-elaborated help
(e.g., providing the answer) is not correlated with the explainer's performance
and is negatively correlated with the explainee's performance in the case where
the explainee actually asked for a more elaborated explanation. Webb explains
these results by the fact that providing the answer while the student is expecting
an explanation does not help him or her to understand the strategy, and may
lead the explainee to infer an incorrect strategy or to lose his or her motivation to
understand the strategy.
These findings partially answer the second sub-question of this paradigm, the
relationship between categories of interaction and learning outcomes. The first
sub-question concerns the conditions in which each category of interaction is
more likely to occur. Webb (1991) reviewed several independent variables
concerning group composition, namely, the gender of group members, their
degree of introversion or extraversion and their absolute or relative expertise.
With respect to the latter, explanations are more frequent when the group is
moderately heterogeneous (high ability and medium ability students or medium
ability and low ability students) and when the group is homogeneously
composed of medium ability students. Some other group compositions are
detrimental to the quality of explanations: homogeneous high ability students
(because they assume they all know how to solve the problem), homogeneous
low ability groups (because nobody can help) and heterogeneous groups
comprising high, medium and low ability (because medium ability students
seem to be almost excluded from interactions).
Verba and Winnykamen (1992) studied the relationship between categories of
interactions and two independent variables: the general level of ability and the
specific level of expertise. In pairs where the high ability child was the domain
expert and the low ability child the novice, the interaction was characterised by
tutoring or guidance from the high ability child. In pairs where the high ability
child was the novice and the low ability child the expert, the interaction involved
more collaboration and joint construction.
3.3.2 Control
Rogoff (1990, 1991) conducted various experiments in which children solved a
spatial planning task with adults or with more skilled peers. She measured the
performance of children in a post-test performed without help. Overall she
found better results with adult-child than with child-child pairs but, more
interestingly, she identified an intermediate variable which explains these
variations. Effective adults involved the child in an explicit decision making
process, while skilled peers tended to dominate the decision making. This was
confirmed by the children who collaborated with an adult; those who scored
better in the post-test were those for which the adults made the problem solving
strategy explicit. These results are slightly biased by the fact that the proposed
task (planning) is typically a task in which metaknowledge plays the central
role. A socio-cultural interpretation would be that the explication of the problem
solving strategy provides the opportunity to observe and potentially internalise
the partner's strategy. From a socially shared cognition viewpoint, one could
say that making the strategy explicit is the only way to participate in each other's
strategy and progressively establish a joint strategy.
4 Tools for observing interactions
When collaboration is mediated via a computer system, the design of this
system impacts on the collaborative process. This mediation has methodological
advantages: the experimenter may have explicit control over some aspects of
collaboration (e.g., setting rules for turn taking, determining the division of
labour or distribution of activities). The effects of the computer as medium also
has pedagogical aspects: to support the type of interactions that are expected to
promote learning. We describe three settings in which the computer influences
collaboration..
4.1 Two human users collaborate on a computer-based task
Until relatively recently, one of the main advantages associated with computer
use in schools was seen in terms of the potential for individualised learning.
However, since schools generally have more students than computers, children
often work in groups at the computer. Several empirical results suggest that
group work Ñ at least dyadic work Ñ at the computer may enhance the benefit
derived from the collaborative learning situation (for a review, see Blaye et al,
1990). The specific questions to be addressed here deal with the extent to which
learner(s)-computer interaction and human-human interaction can reciprocally
enhance one another. For instance, interfaces which induce a specific
distribution of roles between learning partners help to foster social interaction
(O'Malley, 1992; Blaye et al., 1991). Such interfaces can serve to scaffold the
executive and regulative aspects of the collaborative task. Another interesting
example concerns the principle of immediate feedback which was seen as a
critical feature in the first generation of educational software. It seems that
immediate feedback may prevent fruitful exchanges between human co-learners
because they then rely on the system to test their hypotheses instead of
developing arguments to convince one another (Fraisse, 1987). In other words,
aspects of the software can modify the socio-cognitive dynamics between the
learning partners. In particular, the computerised learning environment
constitutes in itself a mediational resource which can contribute to create a
shared referent between the social partners (Roschelle & Teasley, in press).
This research does not aim to build a Ôtheory' of human-human collaboration at
the computer. The fact that the medium (i.e., the computer) is similar is by no
means a sufficient reason to unify this field of research. Different interfaces,
different computer-based tasks and activities may yield very different
interactions and learning outcomes. However, for the sake of simplicity, we
refer generically to computer-based activities in order to discuss the other
general parameters which exert an influence (e.g., frequency of feedback,
representations induced by the interface, role distribution, etc.).
4.2 Computer-mediated collaboration
While the previous setting was influenced by research in educational
technology, the setting considered here has developed in parallel with work on
'computer-supported cooperative work' (CSCW). This discipline covers
communication systems from simple electronic mail to more advanced
ÔgroupwareÕ (Shrage, 1992). There are various ways in which computers can
support communication. In the past, this technology has been restricted to
textual communication, but developments in broad bandwidth technology allow
for more exciting possibilities such as synchronous shared workspaces and
two-way audio-visual communication. Generally speaking, broad bandwidth is
expected to afford greater opportunities for collaboration. This does mean that
older technologies should be superseded. For instance, asynchronous text-
based communication provides time for reflection on messages and allows
students lacking in confidence to learn nevertheless by ÒeavesdroppingÓ on
conversations. In addition, low bandwidth communication may have some
advantage in that, if it takes time and costs money in terms of connect time and
if displays are restricted to a screen at a time, students may be forced to consider
their responses more carefully.
Computer-mediated communication settings enables the experimenter to
consider the communication bandwidth as factor. For instance, Smith et al.
(1991) observed that task distribution was easier with a larger bandwidth (i.e.,
when seeing each other via video instead of audio-only communication) and
when the setting gave users the feeling of being side-by-side, through having a
shred workspace. They also observed that establishing face-to-face contact
seems to be important during reflection stages, e.g., when partners discuss their
observations, hypotheses or strategies. This fits in with research on mediated
communication which, in general, suggests that face-to-face communication is
more effective than audio-only communication for tasks which involve elements
of negotiation (see Short, Williams & Christie, 1976).
4.3 Human-computer collaborative learning
Human-computer collaboration refers to situations where the system and the
human user share roughly the same set of actions. We don't include systems
which support an asymmetric task distribution, as between a user and a word
processor, for instance. We describe two types of system where some learning
is supposed to result from collaborative activities: apprenticeship systems and
learning environments. Most of these systems do not actually fully satisfy the
symmetry criterion.
An apprenticeship system is an expert system that refines its knowledge base by
watching a human expert solving problems. The human expert is actually more
teaching the system than collaborating with him or her, but the techniques
developed are relevant to collaborative learning. The expert's behaviour is
recorded as an example and the system applies explanation-based learning
(EBL) techniques to learn from this example. In ODISSEUS (Wilkins, 1988),
the system attempts to explain each human action in order to improve the
HERACLES-NEOMYCIN knowledge base. An explanation is a sequence of
metarules that relate the observed action to the problem-solving goal. If
ODISSEUS fails to produce the explanation, it tries to "repair" its knowledge
base by relaxing the constraints on the explanation process. LEAP (Mitchell et
al., 1990) applies a similar approach to the design of VLSI circuits. The user
can reject the proposed solution and refine the circuit him or herself. In this
case, LEAP attempts to create rules that relate a given problem description to the
circuit specified by the expert-user. LEAP explains why the circuit works for
the given input signal and then generalises the explanation to create the rule
premises. The interesting aspect is that these systems attempt to acquire the
metaknowledge used by an expert, a central issue in the Vygotskian approach.
However these systems rely on EBL techniques which requires a complete
theory of the domain. Human learners theories are rarely complete and
consistent. Some research has been carried out to by-pass this problem by
integrating EBL with analogical and inductive learning (Tecuci and Kodratoff,
1990).
Not surprisingly, the idea of human-computer collaborative learning has also
been applied to educational software. It has firstly been suggested as an
alternative technique for student modelling (Self, 1986), then as an attempt to
break the computer omniscience that dominates educational computing
(Dillenbourg, 1992). An interesting issue concerns the necessity to have a
plausible co-learner. Along the continuum of design choices, we can
discriminate levels of 'sensitivity'. At the first level, we could imagine an
ELIZA-like system which randomly asks questions in order to involve the
learner in plausible collaborative activities. Second level systems include a co-
worker, i.e., an agent which solves problems during the interaction but which
is not learning. For instance, the Integration Kid (Chan & Baskin, 1988) does
not learn, but jumps (an the tutor's request) to the next pre-specified knowledge
level. At the third level, we have a real co-learner, i.e., a learning algorithm
whose outputs are determined by its activities with the world, including its
interactions with the human learner (Dillenbourg & Self, 1992). This research
has not yet produced enough empirical data to determine whether more sensitive
systems are more efficient than less sensitive one.
Another interesting issue to be addressed here is that the phenomena observed
in human-human collaboration are repeated in human-computer collaboration.
Salomon (1990) raises an important point in terms of knowing whether human-
computer interaction has potential for internalisation similar to human-human
conversations. He suggests (Salomon, 1988) that some graphic representations
could have this potential. We observed (Dillenbourg, in press) that learners
were not very 'tolerant' with the computer: firstly, they had difficulties in
accepting that the computerised partner makes silly mistakes, then, when the
computer was repeatedly wrong, they stopped making suggestions altogether.
The advantage of human-computer collaborative systems for the study of
collaboration is that the experimenter can tune several parameters regarding to
the pair composition (for instance, the initial knowledge of the co-partner).
5 Tools for analysing interactions
At the present state of research, it is not clear which theoretical perspective is
most fruitful for analysing interactions, although incidence of socio-cognitive
conflict appears to be limited and restricted largely to Piagetian tasks (Blaye,
1988). However, other researchers have shown that there are benefits in
generating discussions of conflicting hypotheses for domains such as physics
(e.g., Howe et al., 19??). A number of researchers (e.g., Webb, Ender &
Lewis 1986; Blaye, Light, Joiner & Sheldon 1991; Behrend & Resnick 1989)
have shown that various interactive measures other than "conflict" have a
positive correlation with learning outcomes. It may be, as Mandl & Renkl
(1992) suggest, that this uncertainty in the field is due to the fact that the
Piagetian and Vygotskian perspectives as they stand are simply too global to
allow proper explanation of the different results. These authors thus argue that
"more local", domain/task-specific theories should be developed. As Barbieri &
Light (1992) point out, "[s]tudies in collaborative learning at the computer
usually do not go into a detailed analysis of interaction É" (p. 200), despite the
fact that it is "É important to analyse the quality of the interaction more
closely." (p. 200).
5.1 Analysis categories
Most researchers have generally used quite global categories of analysis
grouped according to (at least) the following 'oppositions' : (1) social /
cognitive, (2) cognitive / metacognitive, and (3) task / communicat